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ABSTRACT currently 238 words [Max 250 words] 
 
Objective: To test the vulnerabilities of a wide range of CPOE systems to different types of 
medication errors, and develop a more comprehensive qualitative understanding of how 
their design could be improved.   
Materials and Methods: We reviewed a random sample of 63,040 medication error reports 
from the U.S. Pharmacopeia MEDMARX reporting system where CPOE systems were 
considered a “contributing factor” to errors and flagged test scenarios that could be tested in 
current CPOE systems. Testers entered these orders in 13 commercial and homegrown 
CPOE systems across 16 different sites in the U.S. and Canada, using both usual practice 
and where-needed workarounds. Overarching themes relevant to interface design and 
usability/workflow issues were identified. 
Results: CPOE systems often failed to detect and prevent important medication errors. 
Generation of electronic alert warnings varied widely between systems, and depended on a 
number of factors, including how the order information was entered. Alerts were often 
confusing, with unrelated warnings appearing on the same screen as those more relevant to 
the current erroneous entry. Dangerous drug-drug interaction warnings were displayed only 
after the order was placed rather than at the time of ordering. Testers illustrated various 
workarounds that allowed them to enter these erroneous orders.  
Discussion and Conclusion: We found high variability in ordering approaches between 
different CPOE systems, with major deficiencies identified in some systems. It is important 
that developers reflect on these findings and build in safeguards to ensure safer prescribing 
for patients.  
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BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE 
 
Medication errors are extremely common. According to the Institute of Medicine 
(IOM), a hospitalized patient experiences on average at least one medication error per day in 
the United States.(1) It is widely acknowledged that computerized physician order entry 
(CPOE) systems can help prevent medication errors in both inpatient and outpatient 
settings.(2, 3) CPOE systems with clinical decision support (CDS) can provide dosing 
suggestions, eliminate illegible orders, assist with calculations, check for allergies and monitor 
for drug-drug interactions.(4-7) Recognizing these well-established benefits, the federal 
government attempted to accelerate their adoption by offering financial incentives to those 
U.S. hospitals demonstrating meaningful use of electronic health records, including CPOE 
systems.(8) Many studies have concentrated on the effectiveness of internally developed 
systems from academic centers of excellence,(9) but far fewer have evaluated commercially-
purchased systems in community hospitals even though these vendor-developed applications 
represent the vast majority of systems today.(10)  
Concerns about harm from the use of CPOE systems have also emerged. One study 
conducted in a U.S. teaching hospital showed how the use of a system could promote 
medication error risks in addition to reducing them.(11) Examples included fragmented 
computer screen displays that prevented a coherent view of patients’ medications, failure to 
differentiate between look-alike drug names, and inflexible ordering formats generating 
wrong medication orders. Horsky et al.(12) revealed how a serious dosing error of potassium 
chloride resulted from failures in human-computer interaction, such as confusion about on-
screen laboratory results review, uncertainty on the part of physicians about how to manage 
unusual ordering scenarios, and the absence of automated safeguards that help prevent 
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errors. A multi-national study by Ash and colleagues also found instances where technology 
seemed to foster rather than reduce the likelihood of errors.(6) Another study showed 
CPOE systems delivered an overdose of alerts or warning messages to physicians, many of 
which were felt to be irrelevant or inappropriate.(13) Physicians often disregarded these 
messages, and run the risk of overlooking clinically important alerts as well as those that 
were considered unimportant. 
CPOE systems are constantly evolving, but their safety is dependent not only on 
how they are designed, but also on how they are implemented and used in clinical practice, 
and individual institutions have considerable latitude. One study found that about half of 
event fatal medication errors did not result in a warning, and there was almost no correlation 
with vendor.(14) The IOM Committee report Health IT and Patient Safety: Building Safer Systems 
for Better Care discussed various safety issues associated with health IT and recommended 
that specific examples of potentially unsafe processes and risk-enhancing interfaces be 
shared amongst the health IT community.(15) This committee also called for a more 
streamlined approach to the reporting of health IT-related adverse events, and for both 
vendors and users to rectify systemic issues.  
We performed detailed testing of the vulnerabilities of a wide range of leading 
vendor and homegrown, inpatient and outpatient CPOE systems to different types of 
medication errors.(16) Here, we present the qualitative findings from this large, mixed 
methods study conducted over two years in a broad range of healthcare settings to provide a 
more comprehensive understanding of human factors design issues and how these could be 
improved.  
 
MATERIAL AND METHODS 
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As part of a National Patient Safety Foundation-funded project, we approached a 
range of diverse organizations (e.g., academic medical centers, private medical practices) 
using different commercial and homegrown CPOE systems across the United States and 
Canada. Test participants (mostly medical residents or primary care attending physicians, 
henceforth referred to as “testers”) were identified at each of the 16 sites and asked if they 
would be willing to participate. Each tester was offered a small remuneration ($100 gift card) 
for their time.  
 
Test case scenarios 
 
The design of test case scenarios has been discussed at length in our previous 
publication(16) but, in short, we downloaded all 63,040 medication error reports where 
CPOE systems were considered a “contributing factor” to errors from the United States 
Pharmacopeia (USP) MEDMARX reporting system between January 2003 to April 2010. A 
team of pharmacists (MGA, JJB, ACS, MS) and a general internist (GDS) manually reviewed 
a sample of these reports (16.0%, n= 10,060), which included all 191 reports, categorized as 
E-I (an error that resulted in patient harm) according to the National Coordinating Council 
for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention (NCC MERP) classification. A random 
sample of the remaining A–E category reports (no patient harm caused) were also included. 
Of note, 98.18% of the errors occurred in Categories A to D. Category B (an error occurred 
but did not reach the patient) contained the largest number of errors (64.1%), followed by 
Category A (an event occurred that had the capacity to cause error) 18.9% and Category C 
(an error occurred that reached the patient but did not cause harm) with 13.9% of errors.  
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We identified a total of 338 error reports as potential candidates for test scenarios and 
narrowed these down by combining similar scenario types (i.e., orders for drug to which 
patient was allergic) and prioritised based on preselected criteria of (a) frequency, (b) 
seriousness and (c) testability. We then attempted to determine the extent to which current 
CPOE systems were vulnerable to similar errors. These test scenarios described 13 
categories of erroneous or problematic orders arising from realistic clinical encounters 
including: wrong drug, amount, dose, route, units or frequency errors; omission errors; 
duplicate drug or therapy; adjacency errors; drug allergies; drug-drug interactions; and drug-
disease contraindications (see Appendix 1).  
 
Conducting the tests  
 
After obtaining the necessary ethical and institutional approvals, testers were 
instructed to enter these problematic orders on test patients; these were based on CPOE-
related errors reported to a leading medication error reporting system. For example, testers 
were instructed to enter Synthroid® (levothyroxine) 100mg PO daily (instead of 100mcg PO 
daily), which represented a 1000-fold overdose (Test Case 9). They were encouraged to enter 
these orders in the usual and customary way, and where necessary perform workarounds that 
they might typically use to enter such orders. A research assistant (DLW) accompanied by 
either a research pharmacist (MGA, ACS) or general internist (GDS) independently 
observed the testers while they attempted to enter these erroneous orders at U.S. sites. 
Similarly, at the Canadian sites an academic physician (TE) observed the testers enter these 
orders. For each test scenario, the observer rated the ease or difficulty using a specially 
designed data collection sheet and operational definitions (see Appendix 2 and 3, 
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respectively). Testers were also asked to reflect on the overall process, sharing their 
knowledge and experience of using their CPOE system. All test sessions were conducted 
between August 2011 and March 2012. 
   
Data Analysis 
 
An excel file was created and detailed descriptions of testers’ observations and 
verbalizations were recorded. These were then transferred to a Research Electronic Data 
Capture (REDCap) tool.(17) Three independent researchers (SPS, TE, MGA) read through 
these descriptions and annotated them for possible categories. Comparisons were then made 
between testers using the same or different CPOE systems in similar or diverse settings (e.g., 
inpatient or outpatient) at the same or different sites. These annotated transcripts were then 
reviewed as a group and any discrepancies in the coding categories resolved by discussion. 





We examined 13 unique CPOE systems across 16 different sites in the U.S. (n=11; 
Sites 1 to 11) and Canada (n=5; Sites 12 to 16). Two different testers entered the orders at 
each site, apart from Sites 8, 9 and 11 (see Table 1), and we tested two versions of the same 
system (inpatient and outpatient) at two specific sites (i.e., Site 6 and 7). Table 1 also includes 
observers’ rating scores relating to the ease or difficulty in placing the order; no particular 
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setting (in patient vs. outpatient) or type of system (commercial vs. in-house) appeared 
substantially better than any other.  
  
Generation of alert warnings  
We found instances where the same vendor CPOE system responded differently at 
two different sites for Test Case 1 (allergy-drug checking), with one displaying no warning 
messages (e.g., Site 8) and the other providing warning messages that required the tester to 
give a coded reason to override the alert (e.g., Site 2). These different responses may relate to 
how the information was entered in the system. For example, when the tester entered ‘allergy 
to lisinopril’ in an unstructured format (free-text), no allergy warning appeared after selecting 
‘captopril 12.5mg tabs’ from the medication list. However, when the tester added the allergy in 
a structured format (by selecting lisinopril from a medication list), a red warning appeared 
stating: “captopril 12.5 mg tabs note prior adverse reaction with lisinopril”.  
A similar situation arose for Test Case 12 (wrong dose frequency), with no warning 
messages displayed when the tester entered the dose frequency “QID” (four times each day) 
in free text for Cardizem® CD (diltiazem extended release) 120mg at one site (e.g., Site 2). 
However, when the order was placed by changing the dose frequency from “daily” to “QID” 
(structured format) in the same system at another site (e.g., Site 8), a warning message was 
displayed stating: “This product is usually given ONCE DAILY” although it could easily be 
overridden with a single keystroke.  
In Test Case 4 (duplicate drug checking), a duplicate drug warning was generated in 
one system (e.g., Site 1) when the tester entered an order for Lovenox® (enoxaparin sodium 
injection) 40mg subcutaneous daily followed by a second order for Lovenox® 100mg 
subcutaneous twice a day. However, no duplicate alert warnings were displayed if the tester 
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drafted both medication orders in succession in electronic scratchpad before signing.(18) 
Scratch pad (buffer) can hold orders and not deliver them to ancillary departments (e.g., 
pharmacy) for actioning unless required.(18) Testers appeared to be unaware that the 
duplicate drug checking had been switched off in scratchpad, a decision which the IS 
Director explained helped to reduce the ‘noise’ in the system. For Test Case 3 (drug-disease 
checking), the tester understood that the “system has the capability but [it has] not [been] 
programmed locally to date” (e.g., Site 1). No alert warnings were displayed at most of the other 
sites after entering “congestive heart failure” (CHF) on the patient problem list and ordering 
pioglitazone (a situation where it is contraindicated). Several testers commented on how they 
had “never actually seen any alerts for drug-disease interactions previously in their system” (e.g., Site 6 and 
Site 10). For Test Case 2, the tester reported how no drug-drug interaction checking was in 
operation at Site 10 for “non-formulary” drugs. 
No look-alike sound-alike (LASA) warnings were displayed at any of the sites when 
“penicillamine” was ordered instead of “penicillin” in Test Case 10 (adjacency error). Yet at one 
site (e.g., Site 5), LASA warnings were being generated for other drugs including glyburide: 
“'GlyBURIDE LASA Intervention- GlyBURIDE is an oral blood-glucose-lowering drug which belongs 
to sulfonyl-urea class. It should not be confused with GlipiZIDE, a different oral blood-glucose-lowering drug 
which belongs to the sulfonyl-urea class.” Also, no duplicate therapy alerts were displayed when 
metformin and Glucovance® (glyburide and metformin combination) were ordered in 
sequence in Test Case 6 (duplicate therapy checking) at Site 6 or 11. According to the 
respective testers at these sites, “all duplicate order checking is in name only, i.e. there is no ingredient 
checking” for combination drugs (e.g., Site 11) and “order set capability is geared toward ordering 
multiple tabs in combination to obtain desired dose” (e.g., Site 6). There may be situations when two 
drugs from the same class should be prescribed, and thus providing a system warning for 
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individual drug duplicates as opposed to class duplicates would be more appropriate. Finally, 
we were sobered to find that in one system all alerts were inadvertently turned off—an 
unintended consequence of an upgrade to a new release six months earlier, only discovered 
when we undertook our scenario testing of that system.    
 
The wording of alert warnings  
 
Testers often found the wording of alert warnings and ways the information was 
displayed confusing. In Test Case 4 (duplicate drug checking), the duplicate drug warning 
never explicitly said “duplicate” but specified how the drug “already exists ... under the selected 
assessment” (e.g., Site 9). The tester felt this wording was unclear and disliked the way 
warnings for all active orders appeared on the same screen, including those not relevant to 
the current erroneous order (for which an alert would be most relevant). Another tester also 
shared a similar view, explaining how alert warnings (including those generated from 
previous orders) were listed in the same pop up window in the same type of commercial 
CPOE system at a different site (e.g., Site 11). He found himself sifting through all of these 
warnings in order to find the relevant one(s). Although they could be ordered in terms of 
severity, this tester felt that the way these warnings were displayed added to the burden of 
“alert fatigue” at this site.  
In Test Case 3 (drug-disease checking), the tester at one site (Site 2) received a best 
practice advisory warning (as opposed to a drug-disease alert) noting that pioglitazone was 
contraindicated in patients with CHF. These types of alerts were felt to be common and for 
“less severe warnings/interactions”. The tester explained how this particular warning - which was 
arguably more “critical” than most - could easily “get lost in the long list of other warnings that show 
  12 
up simultaneously”. The drug-disease warnings that appeared in another system (e.g., Site 9) 
were considered “prominent but confusing” to the tester. He reflected on how it was hard to 
know which of the two warnings (that appeared in quick succession) were “actually more 
severe”, with one bright red warning stating “Not recommended” and another in orange stating 
“Extreme Caution”.  
 
The timing of alert warnings 
 
The timing of alert warnings differed across CPOE systems. Testers noted how for 
Test Case 2, drug-drug interaction warnings were displayed after both Imdur® (isosorbide 
mononitrate) and Revatio® (sildenafil) had been selected and the order was already signed in 
two different systems (e.g., Sites 2 and 7). It was relatively easy to get to the signing stage but 
an override box still ‘needed to be checked’ before the order could be sent to pharmacy (e.g., Site 
7). Similarly, in Test Case 6 (duplicate therapy checking), the duplicate therapy warning 
appeared only after both metformin and Glucovance® (glyburide and metformin 
combination) had been ordered and signed (e.g., Site 1). In contrast, the same duplicate 
therapy warning appeared before the second order was signed in a different system (e.g., Site 
7). Unfortunately, a number of well-timed warnings were ignored by testers who frequently 




The level of severity of alert warnings  
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Alert warnings varied in their level of severity in different CPOE systems. For 
example, in Test Case 2 (drug-drug interaction checking) some systems generated an 
‘Information only’ alert when Imdur® (isosorbide mononitrate) and Revatio® (sildenafil) were 
ordered together (e.g., Site 6). This was in contrast to others, which generated a hard stop 
‘critical alert’ [highlighted in red] (e.g., Site 4 and 5); the latter required the testers to either 
cancel the current order or discontinue one of the drugs in order to proceed. Similarly, for 
Test Case 4 (duplicate drug checking), the tester was presented with a hard stop alert 
warning after entering an order for Lovenox® (enoxaparin sodium injection) 40mg 
subcutaneous daily followed by a second order for Lovenox® 100mg subcutaneous twice a 
day in the inpatient system (e.g., Site 7). When placing the same order using the equivalent 
outpatient system at the same site, the tester was presented with an interruptive alert warning 
that could easily be overridden with a single keystroke. Testers at Sites 3, 5 and 11 
commented on how they might often need to prescribe the same drug twice in certain cases 
e.g., a different dose of a diabetic drug in both the morning and evening, and thus developed 
workarounds such as entering the brand name of the drug e.g., Glucotrol® (glipizide) for the 
morning and the generic name of the drug (glipizide) for the evening dose to avoid getting 




Testers overcame certain challenges when entering Test Case 9, 11 and 13, as the 
drug name was presented alongside the dose, route or indication in some CPOE systems 
respectively; they developed various workarounds which they had previously learned in using 
the system, such as (i) using the “other” option, (ii) making free text entries in the special 
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instructions or comments field, (iii) changing the default settings, and (iv) selecting ‘off 
formulary’ drugs. For example, in Test Case 9 (wrong units), testers were presented with the 
dose alongside the drug name or dosed product (e.g., Synthroid® 100 mcg), which made it 
difficult to enter the wrong units or dose (mg vs. mcg). One tester successfully placed the order 
for a 1000-fold overdose of Synthroid® (levothyroxine) by selecting the “other” option from 
the pull down menu, entering “100” in the free text box, and selecting the units “mg” from 
the dose list (e.g., Site 7). Testers successfully changed the default strength from “100mcg” to 
“100mg” in the same system without any difficulties at two other sites (e.g., Site 9 and 11). 
Finally, another tester selected Synthroid® (levothyroxine) from the ‘off formulary’ list as 
this had no dose attached to it (e.g., Site 6) and then successfully entered “100mg by mouth 
daily” in free text in the “instruction” field. 
 Testers were presented with the route alongside the drug name in some CPOE 
systems e.g., Tylenol ® (acetaminophen) PO (by mouth) tabs (Site 4), a protection which 
made it difficult to select the wrong route in Test Case 11 (wrong drug route/directions). 
However, testers were able to circumvent this critical safety feature and successfully place 
the erroneous order by making a free text entry in the special instructions or comments field. 
One tester was able to type over the default value of “take 2 tabs” in their CPOE system (e.g., 
Site 11) and noted how “1 puff” and “1 spray” were also presented as selectable options for 
Tylenol® tablets. No relevant warnings were generated in any of the CPOE systems (where 
the successful orders were placed). Another tester at a different site (Site 3) found it hard to 
find the right drug form, and so (based on previous experience of using such a workaround) 
intentionally selected the wrong form from the product list and provide instructions to 
pharmacy to give a different form.  
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Finally, in some systems, testers were presented with the indication alongside the 
drug name which could help prevent selection of the wrong dose for the intended indication 
in Test Case 13 (wrong dose for indication; a dangerous not infrequently reported error).(19) 
A maximum weekly dose of methotrexate was associated with each of the drug-indication 
options in one system (Site 4), including 12.5mg for “Methotrexate (RHEUM) PO” and 15mg 
for “Methotrexate (Non Oncology Use)”. Testers performed workarounds by either typing 
“15mg” in free text in the dose field and “QD” (every day) in the frequency field for 
“Methotrexate (RHEUM) PO”, or selecting “QD” from a structured list for “Methotrexate (Non 
Oncology Use)”. No alert warnings were displayed in either case. This erroneous order was able 
to be readily placed in all CPOE systems except one (Site 5) where the testers were unable to 
change or select “other” to enter a free text frequency; special authorization was required in 
this system to prescribe higher doses/greater than weekly frequencies for “chemo” orders. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
We found an array of CPOE systems often failed to detect and prevent previously 
documented and potentially dangerous medication errors. The generation of electronic alert 
warnings varied widely between systems, and depended on how the order information was 
entered into the system (i.e., in a structured or unstructured way); whether a specific alert 
functionality (e.g., duplicate-drug checking) was operational in the system; and which drugs 
or drug combinations were included in the CDS algorithms). The wording of alert warnings 
was often found to be confusing, with unrelated warnings appearing on the same screen as 
those more relevant to the current erroneous entry that was made. The timing of alert 
warnings differed across CPOE systems, with many dangerous drug-drug interaction 
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warnings displayed only after the order was placed. Alert warnings also varied in their level of 
severity in different systems and even within the same institution (outpatient vs. inpatient 
system). Testers demonstrated a variety of workarounds which they had discovered (and 
used in their practice) to enter such erroneous orders such as (i) using the “other” option, (ii) 
making free text entries in the special instructions or comments field, (iii) changing the 
default settings, and (iv) selecting ‘off formulary’ drugs. Thus, “free text” represented both a 
blessing (ability to overcome frustrations in entering desired orders, and communicating 
intent directly with pharmacy) and curse (circumvented CDS safety checks).   
Testing revealed a range of CDS protections that were either switched off or non-
existent in the different CPOE systems. For example, none of the systems generated LASA 
alerts when “penicillamine” was ordered instead of “penicillin”. In contrast, LASA warnings 
were generated for other drugs at one site. Errors relating to the incorrect selection of 
adjacent drugs from drop-down menus are increasingly being reported in the literature.(20) 
The United States Pharmacopeia identified approximately 1,470 unique drugs implicated in 
medication errors due to brand and/or generic names that looked or sounded alike.(21) It is 
therefore important that relevant LASA warning capability is operational in CPOE systems 
and targets at least the most frequent drug pairs previously implicated in medication errors. 
Also, incorporating the “indication for use” as part of the medication orders could 
potentially prevent drug name error (e.g.,“penicillamine” being ordered for the treatment of 
rheumatoid arthritis or Wilson’s disease rather than penicillin for bacterial infection).  
The wording of alert warnings was found to be unclear in some CPOE systems. 
Human factors principles always need to be considered when developing and implementing 
medication-related alerts and the content of these alerts validated for clarity and 
understandability with the intended users.(22) Display of various warnings completely 
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unrelated to erroneous order (e.g., obscure DDI warnings) was frequently noted in some 
CPOE systems and warrants further attention as excessive irrelevant warnings are likely to 
contribute to alert fatigue with providers overlooking more relevant serious warnings. The 
need to strike the right balance between useful alerting and over-alerting in CPOE systems 
has previously been emphasised, with valuable guidance published on which drug-drug 
interaction alerts should be set as interruptive and non-interruptive.(23, 24) One academic 
institution reported the potential of reducing their alert volume by about a third by safely 
making 33 specific DDI alerts non-interruptive.(24) 
Dangerous drug-drug interaction warnings were displayed only after the order was 
placed in this study. It is less useful for a clinician to spend time finishing the construction of 
a medication order only to be informed after-the-fact that there is a hazardous interaction 
between two of the selected drugs. To enhance alerting efficiency, drug-drug and drug-
allergy warnings ideally should be presented at the time the physician selects the new 
medication.(18) The timing of the alert’s appearance in the clinical workflow is also critical 
for end-user acceptance of the CPOE system and an important predictor of whether it will 
improve clinical practice.(25)  
This study also sheds light on the different attempts testers made to individually 
problem solve and overcome limitations of CPOE systems. For example, presenting the 
drug name alongside the dose was designed to prevent the ordering of excessive medication 
doses. However, testers appeared to be very good at circumventing this intended forcing 
function when conducting Test Case 9 (1000-fold overdose) by (i) using the “other” option, (ii) 
making free text entries in the special instructions or comments field, (iii) changing the 
default settings, and (iv) selecting ‘off formulary’ drugs. One tester purposefully selected the 
wrong drug form from the product list (when he found it hard to find the right form) and 
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provided instructions to pharmacy to give a different form. However, the fact that testers 
had to resort to workarounds for these prescriptions can also be possibly viewed as a 
positive feature of CPOE systems, i.e., the correct dosages and routes of administration were 
easier to enter than the incorrect ones.  It is plausible that real users would not go to the 
trouble when confronted by accurate dosages and routes that were easier to enter than 
incorrect ones. That said, it is less reassuring that many of the erroneous orders (in the 
words of the testers and observers) “sailed right though” with no warnings what so ever. 
This raises important patient safety concerns, as space is sometimes restricted in the ‘other’ 
frequency field of CPOE systems. We recognize that some testers may have been more 
adept at finding workarounds than others, and this variation is a limitation of our study. 
However, careful study of the workarounds by organizations may identify potential threats 
to patient safety and help provide solutions as technology is introduced and updated.  
This study has several implications. Despite two decades of development of CPOE 
systems and CDS, organizations are probably not getting all the safety benefits that they 
could, given the level of variability we found. We fear this slow progress means both that 
patient safety is not being protected, and learning and improvement needs to be accelerated. 
Second, it would not have been possible to anticipate all the sorts of issues that have arisen. 
Thus, there is a clear role for post-implementation testing using a variety of clinical scenarios 
that could enable organizations to improve their systems.(14) The net result is that both 
vendors and hospitals can draw valuable lessons from this kind of evaluation.  
This study has several limitations. It was performed at only a small number of 
institutions, which may not be representative of institutions at large. We also tested a limited 
number of errant orders, but these were actual issues that had been reported as problematic 
in the MEDMARX database. By “instructing” testers to enter these erroneous prescriptions, 
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we introduced an element of artificiality; this was unavoidable in a study of this sort. We also 
do not know how many of these “erroneous orders” would be detected vs. overlooked by 
pharmacists receiving and reviewing these orders. Finally and most importantly, this study 
did not aim to assess the right balance between under-alerting and over alerting. We focused 
on examples of failure to alert, while also documenting evidence of over-alerting from the 
tester comments we collected. Certainly duplicate warnings for the same drug, e.g., 
Glucovance® and metformin, are appropriate; alerting on all class duplications e.g., 
NSAIDS and aspirin may not be particularly helpful.   
In conclusion, we found a high degree of variability in ordering between different 
CPOE systems. Major deficiencies were identified in some of these systems and it is 
therefore critical that developers reflect on these findings and build in safeguards to ensure 
safer prescribing for patients. Human factors principles should always be considered when 
introducing medication-related alerts, and the concerns of clinical users who are likely to be 
directly affected by the decision support capabilities openly discussed.(26) We believe that 
these findings can assist hospitals in selecting areas for new implementation of decision 
support or improvement of their current CPOE system. 
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Appendix 1 – Instructions for testers 
 
 
Test Case 1: Allergy checking 
1. Enter patient allergy for lisinopril in test patient’s chart. 
2. Enter order for captopril 12.5 mg PO (by mouth) TID (three times a day) 
Special instructions: If lisinopril is not available on formulary, use enalapril 5 mg PO daily.  
Test Case 2: Drug-drug interaction (DDI) checking 
1. Enter order for Imdur® (isosorbide Mononitrate) 30 mg PO daily.  
2. Enter order for Revatio® (sildenafil) 20 mg PO TID.  
Special instructions: Enter both orders in sequence without discontinuing the first order.  
Test Case 3: Drug-disease checking 
1. Enter “congestive heart failure” or equivalent to patient’s problem list. 
2. Enter order for pioglitazone 45 mg PO daily.  
Special instructions: Note nature of contraindication warning, if any. 
Test Case 4: Duplicate drug (same exact drug) 
1. Enter order for Lovenox® 40 mg SQ (subcutaneous) daily. 
2. Enter order for Lovenox®  100 mg SQ BID (twice daily). 
Special instructions: Enter both orders in sequence without discontinuing first order. Note: 
intention is for first order to be prophylactic dose, second order to be later initiation of 
therapy without discontinuing prophylactic dose. If Lovenox® is not on formulary, use: 
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(a) dalteparin 5,000 units SC daily AND dalteparin 15,000 units SC daily (for 75 kg person @ 
200 units/kg), OR (b) Arixtra® (fondaparinux sodium) 2.5 mg SC every 24 hrs AND 2. 
Arixtra® (fondaparinux sodium) 7.5 mg every 24 hrs (for 50-100 kg person) 
Test Case 5: Wrong units 
1. Enter order for Insulin Aspart, 60 ml (rather than 60 units) SQ BID. 
Special instructions: None. 
Test Case 6: Duplicate therapy (different drugs, same active ingredient),  
1. Enter order for metformin 1,000 mg PO BID 
2. Enter order for Glucovance® (glyburide/metformin) 5 mg/500 mg PO BID 
Special instructions: Enter both orders in sequence without discontinuing first order.  
Test Case 7: Wrong dispense amount  
1. Enter order for metronidazole 250 mg with instructions: “Take two tablets by mouth 
twice a day.” Duration: seven days. Dispense amount: 14 tablets. 
Special instructions: Enter order using 250 mg tablets only (total dose: 500 mg BID).  
Test Case 8: Omission errors (missing dose, missing instructions) 
1. Enter order for sertraline PO daily (without entering a dose). 
2. Discontinue first order 
[3. Enter order for sertraline 25 mg PO (without instructions).] 
Special instructions: This is a two-part test.  
Test Case 9: Wrong units (mg vs. mcg), 1000-fold overdose 
1. Enter order for Synthroid® (levothyroxine) 100 mg PO daily.  
Special instructions: None. 
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Test Case 10: Wrong drug (Look-alike-sound-alike); adjacency error 
1.Type “penicil” into drug search function. 
2. Select penicillamine from menu (even though what was desired was penicillin). 
Special instructions: Note carefully whether penicillin and penicillamine are adjacent on the 
pull-down menu.  
Test Case 11: Wrong drug form/route, Wrong instructions 
1. Enter order for Tylenol® Junior Strength Chewable Tabs, 160 mg, 24 tablets with 
instructions to administer “1 dropperful every 4 hours.” 
Special instructions: None. 
Test Case 12: Wrong frequency for drug form 
1. Enter order for Cardizem® CD (diltiazem extended-release) 120 mg PO QID  
Special instructions: Make sure to select CD (extended-release) formulation. 
Test Case 13: Wrong dose for indication, order set issues, pull-down menu errors 
1. Enter order for methotrexate 15 mg PO daily.  
Special instructions: Erroneous order being placed inadvertently for patient with rheumatoid 
arthritis who should receive weekly, i.e., this is correct dose but incorrect frequency for 
indication. Daily frequency is used for treatment of NH-lymphoma.  
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Appendix 2 – Data Collection Sheet 
 
1. Tester/Test ID 
2. Site Name 
3. CPOE System/Vendor 
4. Was the order able to be placed? (Yes; No; Uncertain/Maybe; Untestable) Any 
additional comments? 
5. How easy was it to place the order? (Easy; Minor workarounds; Some difficulty; 
Difficult but possible; Impossible; see Appendix 3)  
6. Type of warning? 
7. Were any warnings displayed in the course of entering the order? Any 
additional comments? 
8. Describe what happened in the course of entering the order? 
9. Describe workaround efforts attempted/required by the tester? 
10. Does the tester have any additional comments about this particular order? 
11. Has the tester seen or experienced a similar situation while trying to prescribe 
this drug (or others) in this CPOE system? Other CPOE systems? Any 
additional comments? 
12. How frequently? 
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Appendix 3 – Operational Definitions 
 
ERRONEOUS Orders 
How easy was it to place the order?  
1     2         3              4         5 
Easy                  Minor                      Some          Difficult                    Impossible  
        Workarounds            protections 
 
1. Easy 
 Tester successfully and quickly entered the order 
 No alerts/warnings 
 No workarounds or additional mouse clicks required 
 Order “sailed through” 
 
2. Minor Workarounds 
 Tester is able to enter the order fairly easily 
 No alerts/warnings  
 Requires some kind of additional workarounds (e.g., forced to enter all or part of 
the order in free text, or use of comments field to complete order) 
 
3. Some protections 
 Tester is able to enter the order 
 “Passive” alerts/warnings appear 
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a. Warning appears but it can be ignored (no override required)  
b. Warning appears but can override with single mouse-click (this includes 
selecting a reason for override from pull-down menu) 
 Typical response from the provider is to say “I usually just blow through these 
[warnings]” or equivalent 
 
4. Difficult 
 Tester is able to enter the order, but doing so requires a conscious, concerted 
effort 
 “Active” alerts/warnings appear that require additional action from provider (e.g. 
typed reason for override) 
 Often, typed workarounds AND extra mouse clicks are required to override 
 Order often does not go through on first attempt 
 Significant time and thought required to enter successfully 
 Palpable tester frustration 
 
5. Impossible 
 Order could not be entered, despite attempted workarounds and tester 
frustration 
 No way to enter order in free text comments field 
 Hard stop warnings appear or significant changes are required to send to 
pharmacy (e.g. required to d/c order or remove drug/diagnosis) 
 System is completely “bulletproof,” at least in regard to this particular order
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Table 1. Characteristics of Data Collection Sites and scores 




1 Academic Medical Center Combination--
Inpatient/Outpatient 
301-500 Commercial 34 2.6 
2 Multispecialty Group Practice Outpatient >500,000 outpatient 
visits/year 
Commercial 34 2.6 
3 Community Teaching Hospital Inpatient 101-300 Commercial 48 3.7 
4 Academic Medical Center Outpatient >700,000 outpatient 
visits/year 
In-house 30 2.4 
5 Academic Medical Center Inpatient 500 or more In-house 41 3.2 
6A Community Hospital Inpatient 101-300 Commercial 29 2.2 
6B Community Outpatient Clinic Outpatient 12,000 patients Commercial 21 1.6 
7A Academic Medical Center Outpatient >500,000 outpatient 
visits/year 
In-house 32 2.5 
7B Academic Medical Center Inpatient 500 or more In-house 38 2.9 
8 Academic Medical Center Inpatient 500 or more Commercial 35 2.7 
9 Private practice physician office Outpatient n/a‡ Commercial 26 2.0 
10 Community Teaching Hospital Inpatient 101-300 Commercial 42 3.2 
11 Private practice physician office Outpatient n/a Commercial 34 2.6 
12 Private practice physician office Outpatient n/a Commercial 43 3.3 
                                                        
* Our agreement with the test sites precludes revealing more specific details about each system.  
† The sum and average scores across all 13 tests in answer to the question “How easy was it to place the erroneous order?” 
‡ Private practice physician offices did not contain beds hence not applicable (n/a) 
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13 Private practice physician office Outpatient n/a In-house 28 2.2 
14 Private practice physician office Outpatient n/a Commercial 31 2.4 
15 Private practice physician office Outpatient n/a Commercial 37 2.8 
16 Private practice physician office Outpatient n/a Not-for-profit 
corporation 
27 2.1 
 
 
 
 
